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Abstract
Undoubtedly, the mental models theory has become an important theory in cognitive 
science. This theory can predict and explain most of the experimental results that the 
literature of that field shows. This fact can lead one to think that human mental processes 
are essentially semantic and that the syntactic approaches can no longer be held. In this 
way, in this paper, I try to analyze a framework based on formal rules, the mental logic 
theory, which also seems consistent with the experimental results, and review some of 
the reasons that its proponents often give in order to prove that it is worth continuing to 
consider it as an explicative alternative to the mental models theory. However, I show that 
such reasons can be questioned from the mental models theory and that, therefore, they 
need to be explained in a clearer way.
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Resumen
Indudablemente, la teoría de los modelos mentales se ha convertido en una teoría 
importante en el ámbito de la ciencia cognitiva. Esta teoría puede predecir y explicar la 
mayoría de los resultados experimentales que se hallan en la literatura. Tal hecho puede 
llevar a pensar que los procesos mentales humanos son esencialmente semánticos y que 
en el presente ya no es posible defender enfoques sintácticos. En este sentido, en este 
trabajo, trato de analizar un marco basado en reglas formales, la teoría de la lógica mental, 
que también parece consistente con los resultados experimentales, y de revisar algunas de 
las razones que sus defensores ofrecen a menudo para probar que puede ser productivo 
continuar considerándolo como una alternativa explicativa a la teoría de los modelos 
mentales. No obstante, muestro que esas razones pueden ser cuestionadas desde la teoría 
de los modelos mentales y que, por tanto, necesitan ser explicadas de un modo más claro.
Palabras clave
Semántica, sintaxis, reglas formales, lógica mental, modelos mentales.
Some arguments that the mental logic theory needs 
to clarify to continue being an alternative to the mental 
models theory1
Algunos argumentos que la teoría de la lógica mental 
necesita aclarar para continuar siendo una alternativa 
a la teoría de los modelos mentales
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Introduction
It is obvious that the mental models 
theory (from now on, MM), which is explained, 
described, and commented on in papers such 
as, for example, Byrne and Johnson-Laird 
(2009), Johnson-Laird (1983, 2001, 2006, 
2010, 2012, 2015), Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and 
Girotto (2009), Khemlani and Johnson-Laird 
(2009), Oakhill and Garnham (1996), or Orenes 
and Johnson-Laird (2012), is a very relevant 
theory at present. In addition to the fact that it 
has wide acceptance in the field of psychology 
of reasoning and cognitive science, MM has 
proved to be consistent with almost all the 
experimental results that can be found in the 
literature on cognition. For these reasons, it 
can be thought that this theory is the theory that 
best accounts for human inferential activity, 
that it is right to claim that mental processes are 
basically semantic, and that neither syntax nor 
logical forms play any role in such processes.
Thus, it seems that MM is revealing that 
formal approaches such as that of Rips (1994) 
or that of the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998a; O’Brien, 2009, 2014; O’Brien 
& Li, 2013) must be overcome. However, this 
last theory, the mental logic theory (from now 
on, ML), is also coherent with many of the 
experimental findings reported by the literature 
on cognitive science, and, for this reason, its 
proponents state that there is no conclusive 
evidence that leads to its absolute rejection, and 
that the literature fails to demonstrate that it is a 
mistaken or incorrect theory.
My aim in this paper is to show that, while 
it is true that ML can offer arguments in its favor, 
it is also true that MM can easily respond to those 
arguments and that, if the proponents of ML 
want their theory to continue to be an alternative 
to be considered, they must necessarily clarify 
certain aspects of it. I will expose and explain 
in details all of this in the next pages. To do 
that, I will base on not only works such as those 
cited above, but also other papers in which 
the discussion between the two approaches 
is more explicit (e.g., López-Astorga, 2014a, 
2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a; O’Brien, 
Braine, & Yang, 1994; Schroyens, Schaeken, & 
D’Ydewalle, 2001). In this way, I think that what 
is appropriate is to start by describing the general 
theses both of MM and ML.
The semantic approach of MM
As said, MM is fundamentally a semantic 
theory. It states that syntax is not important in 
human reasoning and that individuals, when they 
reason, pay attention to the semantic possibilities 
or models of propositions. In this way, what 
people do is to look for the models in which, if 
the premises are true, the conclusion is true too.
One interesting point of MM is that 
individuals do not always identify all the 
models to which the propositions refer. Thus, 
it distinguishes between ‘mental models’ and 
‘fully explicit models’. People immediately 
and easily detect the mental models. However, 
the fully explicit models can only be noted if a 
greater effort is made. Each logical connective, 
conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and 
biconditional, has its models, but I will only 
consider here, as an example, the conditional. 
According to MM, a proposition such as ‘if A 
then B’ has a mental model:
A and B
Nonetheless, its fully explicit models are 
the following:
A and B
¬A and B
¬A and ¬B
Where ‘¬’ denotes negation.
In this way, it is not hard for MM to explain 
phenomena such as the fact that the modus ponens 
rule is often less difficult than the modus tollens 
rule for individuals (see, for example, Byrne & 
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Johnson-Laird, 2009). As it is well known, the 
modus ponens schema is this one:
If A then B
A
-------------
Ergo B
Given that, as mentioned, the mental 
model of the conditional is ‘A and B’, it is 
evident, following MM, that, in a scenario in 
which it is known that ‘if A then B’ and ‘A’ are 
true, most people will tend to draw that ‘B’ is 
true too. Nevertheless, the case of the modus 
tollens rule is different. As is also well known, 
its schema is as follows:
If A then B
¬B
-------------
Ergo ¬A
As can be noted, ‘¬A’ can only be derived 
from ‘if A then B’ and ‘¬B’ if the fully explicit 
models are taken into account, in particular, 
the model ‘¬A and ¬B’. So, because it is more 
difficult for individuals to consider the fully 
explicit models than to detect the mental models, 
it is clear, according to MM, why modus ponens 
is often easier than modus tollens.
This example may serve as an illustration 
of how MM explains and predicts individuals’ 
behavior in reasoning tasks. The literature on 
MM is extensive, but, in my view, the above 
description of the problems of modus ponens 
and modus tollens provides a clear idea about its 
general framework. In any case, more aspects 
of this theory will be commented below.
The syntactic approach of ML
Nonetheless, ML offers a syntactic fra-
mework. The main thesis of ML seems to be 
that human reasoning works following formal 
rules and its adherents have proposed a number 
of such rules, which have not been selected ran-
domly, but in accordance with empirical results. 
In other words, ML only accepts the formal rules 
that, according to experiments reported in the li-
terature on reasoning, people really use.
In this way, ML distinguishes different 
types of rules (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, 
1998b): ‘Core Schemas’, which are used as 
often as possible, ‘Feeder Schemas’, which are 
used as often as necessary, ‘Incompatibility 
Schemas’, which refer to contradictions, and 
‘Other Schemas’, which play a limited role in 
the ‘Direct Reasoning Routine’ and are more 
linked to learned abilities.
Core Schemas are a set of basic and 
simple rules. Some of them are, for example, a 
version of the modus tollendo ponens rule:
A1 or… or An, ¬Ai; ergo A1 or… or Ai-
1or Ai+1 or… or An (schema 3 in Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998b, p. 80. ‘A1 or… or An’ and 
‘¬Ai’ are premises; on the other hand, what is 
after the word ‘ergo’, i.e., ‘A1 or… or Ai-1or 
Ai+1 or… or An’ is the conclusion).
And the modus ponens rule (schema 7 
in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b). A representative 
Feeder Schema is, on the other hand, the 
conjunction elimination rule:
A1 and… and Ai and… An; ergo Ai (schema 
9 in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 80). 
Obviously, an Incompatibility Schema is 
this one:
A, ¬A; ergo INCOMPATIBLE (schema 10 in 
Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 81).
Finally, the set of Other Schemas includes 
rules such as that of conditional introduction:
[A(supposition);ergo B]; ergo if A then B (sche-
ma 12 in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 81).
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But a very interesting aspect of ML is that 
it contains a program that describes reasoning 
processes and the order in which the rules or 
schemas are applied (see Braine & O’Brien, 
1998b, pp. 82-83). Thus, ML is a system that 
also has great explanatory and predictive po-
tentialities, and this fact can be seen if the case 
of modus ponens and modus tollens of the pre-
vious section is considered again. It is evident 
that, according to ML, individuals can easily 
make inferences with a structure similar to mo-
dus ponens, since, as mentioned, modus ponens 
is a Core Schema and it is an inference with 
only three steps:
(1) p -> q (premise)
(2) p (premise)
(3) q (S7 1, 2)
Where ‘->’ stands for conditional 
relationship and ‘S7’ represents ‘schema 7’, 
(i.e., as said, the modus ponens rule).
However, modus Tollens is more com-
plex. It is not a Core Schema (it is not even a 
schema in ML) and, therefore, it requires more 
inferential steps. According to ML, the modus 
tollens rule involves an ‘Indirect Reasoning 
Strategy’ (so it is not part of the Direct Reaso-
ning Routine), in particular, the ‘Reductio ad 
Absurdum Strategy’, which refers, in a similar 
way as it does in standard propositional cal-
culus, to the need of denying an assumption 
when a contradiction is found. In this way, the 
inference corresponding to the modus tollens 
is this one:
(1) p -> q (premise)
(2) ¬q (premise)
(3) p(assumption)
(4) q (S7 1, 3)
(5) Incompatibility (S10 2, 4)
Where ‘S10’ is ‘schema 10’.
As can be noted, two more steps are 
needed, regardless of the fact that an assumption 
is required and that Reductio ad Absurdum 
is one of the “secondary late-acquired skills, 
which are subject to individual variation, 
although common in adult subjects” (Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998b, p. 79).
In this way, it can be said that ML 
can also explain and predict many cognitive 
phenomena. For this reason, ML can claim that 
the indisputable experimental support that MM 
has does not necessarily mean that ML cannot 
be accepted. In this way, given that ML is also 
consistent with several empirical results reported 
by the experiments carried out by the proponents 
of MM, some arguments in favor of ML can be 
given too. The following are some of them.
Reasons in favor of ML
ML only explains certain inferen-
tial processes, not all of them.
In the literature on cognitive science, 
many logical reasoning tasks that people do not 
often solve correctly are to be found. Orenes 
and Johnson-Laird (2012) indicate some clear 
examples. One of them is the following:
“David visited England. Does it follow that 
David visited Paris or he visited England?” 
(Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 375).
If we assume that ‘V’ is the logical 
disjunction, that ‘p’ stands for ‘David visited 
Paris’, and that ‘q’ means ‘David visited 
England’, the structure of this task is very 
simple and easy:
q
--------------
Ergo p V q?
According to standard propositional cal-
culus and frameworks such as that of Gentzen 
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(1935), the response would be positive becau-
se this task only needs the use of a simple and 
basic rule, the disjunction introduction rule (q; 
ergo p V q). Nevertheless, in one of their expe-
rimental conditions, Orenes and Johnson-Laird 
(2012) checked that their participants tended to 
answer ‘no’ in tasks akin to this one.
Obviously, Orenes and Johnson-Laird’s 
(2012) results enable to think that the human 
mind does not work in accordance with formal 
rules because, if this were the case, individuals 
would respond affirmatively in tasks such as that 
described. Nonetheless, it can also be thought 
that their results only mean that the human mind 
is not led by standard propositional logic or 
systems such as that of Gentzen. As indicated, 
ML is not classical logic and it only admits 
some rules of that logic, in particular, the rules 
that empirical evidence suggests. In fact, the 
disjunction introduction rule is not a valid schema 
in ML and so Orenes and Johnson-Laird’s (2012) 
results are not only compatible with the theses of 
ML, but also predicted by ML. 
Besides, according to ML, even in the case 
that we noted that the participants in experiments 
do not use some of the schemas proposed by it, 
that fact would not demonstrate that ML is an 
incorrect theory. Another relevant aspect of ML 
is that, as argued by O’Brien (1998), ML does 
not claim exclusivity. The fact that there is a 
mental logic in the human mind does not mean 
that the human mind only works following that 
mental logic, or that it always works following 
that logic. In his view, it seems inappropriate 
to link the different cognitive approaches on 
reasoning (including, of course, MM and ML) 
by means of an exclusive disjunction. Different 
theories may co-exist and, if it is proved that 
one of those theories is the only theory that can 
account for a particular cognitive phenomenon 
or a particular experimental result, it does not 
mean that the other theories do not hold. It is 
possible that several theories are valid at the 
same time, and that some of them can explain 
certain phenomena that the other theories cannot.
In this way, it can be said, for example, that 
ML is absolutely compatible with frameworks 
such as that of the dual-process theory (e.g., 
Evans, 2008; Reyna, 2004; Stanovich, 1999, 
2004, 2012). The dual-process theory states 
that there are two different systems or types 
of reasoning in the human mind. The first one 
(which is often denominated ‘S1’ or ‘T1’) refers 
to heuristics and biases, and the second one 
(which is often named ‘S2’ or ‘T2’) is linked 
to people’s analytical abilities, i.e., to logical 
reasoning. Thus, it can be thought that, in certain 
occasions, the human mind is led by heuristics 
or biased (i.e., by S1 or, if preferred, T1) and 
that, in other cases, its conclusions are logical 
(when it is led by S2 or, if preferred, T2). It can 
hence be assumed that, only in these last cases, 
individuals reason using a mental logic such as 
that described by ML, since, in short, ML does 
not state that human beings are always logically 
thinking.
Thus, an interesting idea could be to 
assume that ML and MM can be accepted at 
the same time. Regardless of the fact that some 
studies suggest that there are links between 
the semantic and the syntactic approaches to 
reasoning (e.g., López-Astorga, 2013, 2014c), 
ML, although with certain concerns, explicitly 
admits the possibility of inferences based on 
mental models. In this connection, O’Brien 
says, “I make no claim that people never use 
mental models – only that inferences from 
mental models would cohabit with inferences 
from other sources, including those of a mental 
logic” (O’Brien, 1998, p. 42). Therefore, from 
this point of view, it can be thought that to carry 
out experiments in order to prove that ML does 
not hold is not a too productive task.
On the other hand, it is true that there are 
empirical findings that, at least until now, only 
appear to be explained by MM. However, due to 
the above, ML does not consider such findings 
to be a difficulty. Some of such empirical 
results can be found, for example, in Orenes 
and Johnson-Laird’s (2012) paper. As indicated, 
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both MM and ML can account for the fact that 
people do not apply the disjunction introduction 
rule. Nevertheless, Orenes and Johnson-Laird 
(2012) state that only MM can account for the 
action of modulation in problems related to that 
rule.
According to MM, there are modulation 
mechanisms linked to pragmatic factors and to 
the contexts and the meanings of propositions. 
Thus, in its view, those modulation mechanisms 
can cause certain models to be blocked. If we 
take the previous example (that related to David, 
Paris, and England) into account again, it can 
be said that MM explains why people do not 
accept the inference by means of the following 
argument: inclusive disjunctions have these 
three fully explicit models:
A and B
A and ¬B
¬A and B
In this way, this means that, in the 
mentioned example, the possibilities 
corresponding to the conclusion are as follows:
David visited Paris and David visited England
David visited Paris and David did not visit 
England
David did not visit Paris and David visited 
England
Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) think 
that the problem is the second possibility (David 
visited Paris and he did not visit England), since 
it is inconsistent with the premise (David visited 
England). So, in their view, if MM is right, a 
modulation of the conclusion that removes that 
problematic possibility should cause individuals 
to accept the inference. Thus, they propose this 
modulated version:
“Paco visited France. Does it follow that Paco 
visited Paris or he visited France?” (Orenes & 
Johnson-Laird, 2012, p. 375).
As it can be noted, now the possibilities 
of the conclusion are only:
Paco visited Paris and Paco visited France
Paco did not visit Paris and Paco visited France
The second possibility has disappeared be-
cause it is not possible that Paco visits Paris and 
he does not visit France. For this reason, Orenes 
and Johnson-Laird’s (2012) prediction is that, in 
cases such as this one, their participants will ad-
mit the conclusion, and, indeed, their prediction 
was confirmed, since most of their participants 
answered positively to the question in experi-
mental conditions such as the previous one.
Although they do not refer to the 
explanation indicated by me above (that 
related to the fact that ML does not accept the 
disjunction introduction rule), but to others, 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) acknowledge 
that the formal theories can explain why people 
do not admit versions such as the first one (that 
related to David, Paris, and England), but the 
key is, in their opinion, that those theories 
cannot explain why individuals tend to admit 
the modulated versions. But the proponents 
of ML can think that this fact is not a problem 
for their theory and they can give at least two 
reasons in this regard.
On the one hand, ML also considers 
pragmatics to play a role in human thought 
and hence it is possible that the adherents of 
ML can offer an account of this phenomenon 
based only on their assumptions in the future 
(in fact, López-Astorga, 2015a, already offers 
some lines or ideas to look for that account 
from ML). Nevertheless, on the other hand, if 
that were not the case, it would not imply that 
ML must be rejected. As said, ML can co-exist 
with other theories and it is not a problem for 
it that a particular empirical result can only be 
explained by MM. The fact that human beings 
have a mental logic does not mean that they 
never reason using, for example, mental models.
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Pragmatics has an influence on 
reasoning.
As mentioned, ML considers the role 
of pragmatics in human reasoning. This role 
is clearly explained, for example, in Braine 
and O’Brien (1998c). In that work, a previous 
experiment is commented. That experiment 
consists of the following text:
John went in for lunch. The menu showed a 
soup’s salad special, with free cola or coffee. 
Also, with the minute steak you got a free 
glass of red wine. John chose the soup’n salad 
special with coffee, along with something else 
to drink…
a)  John got a free cola? (Yes, No, Can’t tell)
b)  John got a free glass of red wine (Yes, No, 
Can’t tell)” (Braine & O’Brien, 1998c, p. 46).
Braine and O’Brien (1998c) state that the 
answer both to (a) and to (b) is ‘No’. However, 
it can be thought that, in principle, it appears 
that mental logic cannot account for those 
answers, since the premises are:
(1) p -> (q V r) (premise)
(2) s -> t (premise)
(3) p & q (premise)
Where ‘&’ stands for conjunction and the 
equivalences are as follows:
p: John chooses the soup’n salad special.
q: John gets free coffee.
r: John gets free cola.
s: John chooses the minute steak.
t: John gets a free glass of wine.
Obviously, step 3 refers to the fact that 
John chose the soup’n salad special and coffee, 
but the most important point here is that, as 
said, apparently, the rules of mental logic do 
not enable to respond to the questions. Only 
two more steps seem possible:
(4) p (S9 3)
(5) q V r (S7 1, 4)
Where ‘S9’ represents the schema 9 in 
Braine and O’Brien (1998b). Nevertheless, as 
it can be noted, steps 4 and 5 are not enough to 
respond to the questions.
Nonetheless, Braine and O’Brien 
(1998c) say that individuals have certain 
information, provided by pragmatics, related 
to the described scenario. They know that the 
disjunction q V r is, in this case, exclusive, 
since it is not usual that restaurants offer free 
cola and free coffee with the same election and 
at the same time, i.e., they know that ¬(q & r). 
Likewise, because of their general knowledge, 
they also know that restaurants do not often 
offer a free glass of wine with food, unless 
otherwise explicitly indicated. They can hence 
think that, in that scenario, a free glass of wine 
is only possible if the minute steak is elected, 
i.e., that t -> s. In the same way, because John 
chose the soup’n salad special, they also know 
that he did not elect the minute steak, i.e., they 
also know that ¬s.
Therefore, given that pragmatics seems 
to provide three additional premises it can be 
stated that the real inference corresponding to 
this experiment is this one:
(1) p -> (q V r) (premise)
(2) s -> t (premise)
(3) p & q (premise)
(4) ¬(q & r) (pragmatic premise)
(5) t -> s (pragmatic premise)
(6) ¬s (pragmatic premise)
(7) q (S9 3)
(8) ¬r (S4 4, 7)
(9) t (assumption)
(10) s (S7 5, 9)
(11) Incompatibility (S10 6, 10)
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Where ‘S4’ is the schema 4 in Braine 
and O’Brien (1998b), which is a version 
of Chrysippus’ modus ponendo tollens, is 
considered to be other Core Schema in ML, and 
can be formally expressed in this way:
¬(A1 and… and An), Ai; ergo ¬(A1 and… 
and Ai-1 and Ai+1 and… An).
As can be noted, step 8 enables to answer 
to the question (a). Step 9 is the supposition 
that John gets a free glass of red wine, which, 
as shown in step 11, leads to an incompatibility 
and hence allows one to respond to the question 
(b), since, if an incompatibility is found after 
supposing t, it is not possible.
Thus, it is clear that ML can also account 
for certain inferences in which it appears 
that there are not enough premises to draw 
a conclusion by applying its formal rules. 
This point is important because MM often 
resorts to inferences linked to pragmatics in its 
experiments and arguments. A representative 
example in this regard can be the following:
“Pat is in Rio or she is in Brazil.
Pat is not in Brazil.
Therefore, Pat is in Rio” (Johnson-Laird, 
2010, p. 206).
According to Johnson-Laird (2010), most 
individuals do not accept this inference because 
their knowledge blocks one of the possible sce-
narios. In principle, the possibilities would be:
Pat is in Rio and Pat is in Brazil
Pat is in Rio and Pat is not in Brazil
Pat is not in Rio and Pat is in Brazil
Nonetheless, given that it is known that 
Rio is a city in Brazil, individuals tend to reject 
the second model (Pat is in Rio and she is not 
in Brazil). Johnson-Laird (2010) thinks that 
this phenomenon is very hard to explain for 
the formal rules theories, since the inference 
refers to a formal structure that holds in 
standard propositional calculus. That structure 
is Chrysippus’ modus tollendo ponens and, as 
far as the aim of this paper is concerned, the 
problem is that, as said, Braine and O’Brien’s 
(1998b) schema 3 is a version of it.
However, that problem can disappear if 
we pay attention to the fact that Johnson-Laird 
(2010) acknowledges that the formal theories 
have an argument in their defense. There can be 
a hidden or implicit premise, which is not said, 
but is taken into account by people. In this case, 
the premise could be, for example, ‘if Pat is in 
Rio then she is in Brazil’. Thus, this premise, 
along with the third one (Pat is in Rio), enables 
to draw, by modus ponens, or, if preferred, by 
S7, that Pat is in Brazil, which, along the second 
premise (Pat is not in Brazil), leads in turn to 
an inconsistency or incompatibility (Pat is not 
in Brazil and she is in Brazil). This account is 
absolutely consistent with ML, since this latter 
theory, as explained, admits that pragmatics 
plays a role in human inferential activity, and it 
is obvious that pragmatics can give us a premise 
such as ‘if an individual is in Rio then that 
individual is in Brazil’. Most of us know that 
being in Rio involves being in Brazil.
Contradictions do not enable to 
derive everything.
But Johnson-Laird (2010) continues 
to question this last account. His argument 
is that, in standard propositional calculus, a 
contradiction (for example, Pat is in Brazil 
and Pat is not in Brazil) allows one to deduce 
any formula, which means that the use of the 
Reductio ad Absurdum Strategy should lead to 
scenarios in which everything is possible, and 
that, when a contradiction is found (as in the 
case of the previous example), everything can 
be concluded.
Nonetheless, the response to this objec-
tion seems to be simple and Braine and O’Brien 
(1998d) offer it. According to them, contradic-
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tions do not play the same role in human rea-
soning as in standard propositional calculus. 
Indeed, in standard propositional calculus, an 
inconsistency enables to deduce any formula. 
However, in mental logic (or, if preferred, in 
human reasoning), contradictions only reveal 
that at least one of the premises or assumptions 
is false and that it (or, if that is the case, they) 
must be rejected.
Given these three reasons, it can be 
thought that it is obvious that ML continues to 
be a valid alternative for accounting for human 
reasoning. However, I think that MM can 
respond to them without too much difficulty.
The responses of MM
Really, in my view, MM can in turn 
respond to these three arguments in a very easy 
way. On the one hand, it is true that ML does 
not claim that the human mind is able to solve 
all of the reasoning tasks that can be proposed. 
As said, according to ML, individuals only 
resolve those tasks in which schemata accepted 
by it must be used. However, the advantage of 
MM in this regard is that its approach is not 
only the result of empirical studies. It is also a 
theoretical framework that can account for the 
reasons of most individuals’ responses in most 
of the reasoning tasks, whether such responses 
are consistent with standard logic or not. In this 
way, while the argument of ML is simply that 
people do not usually make certain inferences, 
MM explains why they do not make them and 
predict the majority answers. As indicated, in 
the case of the example of David, Paris, and 
England taken from Orenes and Johnson-Laird 
(2012), MM claims that the reason is that one 
of the possibilities to which the sentence ‘David 
visited Paris or he visited England’ refers is 
‘David visited Paris and David did not visit 
England’, i.e., a possibility in contradiction with 
the premise ‘David visited England’. However, 
ML only argues that the empirical data show 
that individuals do not often use the disjunction 
introduction rule.
On the other hand, it is also true that ML is 
a modest theory that is not intended to account 
for all of the cognitive phenomena. In this way, 
the idea that ML and MM can cohabit seems to 
be opportune and make sense. Nevertheless, the 
problem is that the case is not that MM explains 
certain results that ML cannot. The point is that 
what actually happens is that MM explains 
all of the results that can be explained by ML 
and, in addition, other cognitive phenomena 
related to the human inferential activity that ML 
cannot. For example, as mentioned, MM gives 
the reasons why people apply the disjunction 
introduction rule in certain circumstances and, 
for the moment, if López-Astorga’s (2015a) 
paper is ignored, ML does not. So, the fact 
that some experimental results can only be 
explained by MM is a problem for ML. The 
reason is that the current situation is not that 
both theories explain different phenomena. The 
scenario is nowadays that MM accounts for 
more phenomena and results than ML.
As far as pragmatic is concerned, the 
fact that ML resorts to it proves, at least, that 
logical form is not the only important factor in 
reasoning. But, if this is so, this last theory must 
acknowledge that the meaning of the words 
used in the inferences is relevant too, and maybe 
semantics as well. In this way, the role that 
the meaning of words such as ‘cola’, ‘coffee’, 
or ‘restaurant’ in the experiment reported by 
Braine and O’Brien (1998c) and such as ‘Rio’ 
and ‘Brazil’ in the example taken from Johnson-
Laird (2010) plays is obvious. The arguments 
exposed by Johnson-Laird in this latter paper 
can be very illustrative in this way.
Finally, although we accept the ML thesis 
that contradictions only reveal that one (or more) 
of our assumptions or suppositions is (or are) 
wrong, certain grey areas remain. If a particular 
inference includes several assumptions, how 
do we know which the incorrect one (or ones) 
is (or are)? What is the mechanism to discover 
that? Considering the example coming from 
Johnson-Laird (2010) again, which is the false 
244 Miguel lópez-AstorgA
Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas 16 (31): 235-248, Julio-Diciembre de 2016
premise, ‘Pat is in Rio or she is in Brazil’, ‘Pat 
is not in Brazil’, or both of them? (as far as this 
point is concerned, López-Astorga’s, 2016b, 
p. 47, arguments are also very illustrative). 
Obviously, ML needs to clarify points such as 
these ones, and this circumstance suggests that, 
at present, MM is a better alternative and that 
the reasons that the proponents of ML can offer 
are not enough.
Conclusions
There is no doubt that MM is a powerful 
theory that, as indicated, can explain and 
predict most cognitive phenomena linked to 
reasoning. My aim in this paper was not to deny 
this fact. My only goal was to analyze certain 
arguments that can be given from ML in order 
to show that, despite the empirical evidence, it 
continues to be reasonable to accept its general 
framework, and to check whether or not such 
arguments are solid enough to consider ML to 
be an alternative to MM. Unfortunately, my 
conclusion is that this is not, at least clearly, the 
case at present.
ML seems to be only based on experi-
mental results. However, MM not only focuses 
on empirical data. It is a theoretical approach 
with important philosophical roots that trace 
back to Peirce (1931-1958), as acknowledged 
by Johnson-Laird (2012), and his idea of iconic 
representations. In this way, MM is able to pro-
vide an account of the deep causes of human in-
tellectual behavior. Thus, it does not only indi-
cate which the reasoning tasks that individuals 
usually solve in accordance with standard logic 
are, but also why the answers to the other tasks 
are often incoherent with that logic and which 
the responses expected to them are. Evidently, 
ML does not achieve this level of depth yet, but 
maybe it could do that if paid more attention 
to its theoretical bases. Braine and O’Brien 
(1998c) refer to ideas proposed by Fodor (1975) 
and Macnamara (1986) regarding the thesis of 
a language of thought and perhaps this could be 
the way ML could improve in this sense.
Of course, it is absolutely possible that 
there is a syntax leading human inferential 
activity. Nevertheless, the point is that the 
evidence suggests otherwise. MM demonstrates 
that human reasoning can be explained without 
resorting to syntax, but ML cannot prove that 
human reasoning can be accounted for without 
resorting to semantics. The pure logical forms 
are not enough in this latter theory, and, as 
indicated, it needs to consider the meaning of the 
words appearing in the inferences. As far as this 
point is concerned, probably a possible solution 
would have to show a syntax underlying to the 
process of detection or identification of models. 
If, although modulation can eliminate models, 
the connectives (conditional, conjunction, 
disjunction,…) use to always refer to models 
with similar structures (e.g., the conditional use 
to always have the same mental model and the 
same fully explicit models), that circumstance 
can reveal the existence of a hidden syntax. 
Obviously, ML also needs to work on this issue.
Furthermore, other dark spots are to be 
found in ML. This is the case of, for example, 
contradictions. It is true that ML claims that the 
role of incompatibilities in human reasoning 
is not related to Ex Contradictione Quodlibet 
principle (any formula can be derived from a 
contradiction), but to Reductio ad Absurdum. 
Still, in the situations in which there are 
several assumptions, this theory needs, as said, 
to explain in greater details which of those 
assumptions are rejected by the contradiction 
and how that is decided.
A possible option can be to continue 
to develop López-Astorga’s (2013, 2014c) 
arguments and to try to find correspondences 
between semantic approaches such as MM and 
syntactic frameworks. As it is well known, in 
standard logic, the rules are coherent with truth 
tables. For example, the modus ponens rule has 
a truth table in which, when the premises are 
true, the conclusion is also necessarily true. In 
other words, if we assume that ‘v’ represents the 
truth value of the formula that follows between 
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brackets and that ‘1’ stands for truth, it can be said 
that, when v(p -> q) = 1 and v(p) = 1, necessarily 
v(q) = 1. Maybe this correspondence also exists 
in human reasoning and the mental models of 
MM are coherent with the formal rules of ML. 
In short, both theories admit that pragmatics has 
a role. In MM it can block models and in ML it 
can provide premises. Nevertheless, even if this 
idea was accepted, a problem would remain: 
it would be necessary to determine which the 
basic, actual, and primitive mental process is, 
i.e., whether the basic, actual, and primitive 
mental process is semantic or syntactic. Perhaps 
it is syntactic, but the empirical findings of MM 
do not enable to ignore the idea that semantic 
alone can account for human reasoning, and 
that syntax alone cannot, since it needs the help 
of semantics (at least for now, since, as far as I 
know, arguments in favor of a syntax underlying 
to the models of MM have not provided yet).
In view of all that, maybe another choice 
can be that indicated by ML regarding exclusivi-
ty. Thus, we can accept the theory that appears to 
be more coherent and consistent with reality or 
empirical findings, but we should not ignore the 
possibility that one or more of the other approa-
ches is correct at the same time. The problem 
about this choice is that, so far, MM seems to be 
able to explain everything that can be accounted 
for by the rival theories and, in addition, more 
phenomena. Therefore, apart from the fact that 
the principle of parsimony can be invoked in this 
controversy, it is obvious that, if ML wishes to 
continue to be an alternative to MM, it must cla-
rify the points indicated in this paper and deve-
lop to a greater extend their theses.
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